The European Union (EU) has been building its security and defense policy since the 1990s. The evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) process has affected the non-EU European NATO members" position in the European security architecture. The differences in the compositions of NATO and EU members have created undesired issues. As a staunch NATO member and an accession country to the EU, Turkey has also been affected by the developments in the CSDP. This article takes Turkey as a case study in analyzing the state of affairs of the involvement of non-EU European NATO members in the CSDP.
INTRODUCTION
on the approach of the EU to the acquis established for the involvement of non-EU European NATO members in CSDP through the Turkish case. The final section studies reflections of the "participation issue" on NATO-EU cooperation. Case Study strategy is applied as the research method. The empirical material for this study consists of official EU and NATO documents, statements and speeches by relevant officials, press releases of related public institutions, newspaper articles and academic works by relevant scholars. Discourses either written or spoken constitute the backbone of this work.
THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM
CSDP is intergovernmental and organized in the second pillar within a largely supranational European Union. 2 Although the essential intergovernmental nature of decision-making in relation to CFSP and CSDP looks set to prevail with the Lisbon Treaty, nevertheless there are new provisions to facilitate that process in a Union of 27 Member States. By granting the Union a legal personality (ToL, Article 46A) for the first time, the Lisbon Treaty enables it to sign treaties or international agreements towards which it has actively participated in the elaboration and negotiation. Among the various new provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty, many do not challenge the essential inter-governmental nature of foreign and security policy decision making. NATO-EU co-operation is slowly but surely gathering pace and will continue to do so. However, the important issue of participation, which is one of the defining dimensions of the whole process, is yet to be resolved, even though there has recently been some progress. A solution is within our grasp if all the involved parties continue to display the foresight and flexibility. 6 Currently the "participation issue" is also one of the main items in the interaction between NATO and the EU. The NATO-EU partnership was given due attention in NATO"s new Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 and non-EU NATO members" fullest involvement in strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is deemed essential. The relevant part of the new strategic concepts reads as follows: "… Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential (para. 28 European security architecture, were put at the margin of the ESDP decision making mechanism. In short, the ESDP decision making mechanism created a structure that put EU members at the centre and the others at the margin, the latter serving only as "contributors" to the ESDP. Sabahattin Cakmakoglu declared Turkey"s readiness to contribute to the ESDI/P with five thousand troops, 36 F-16 planes, two transportation aircraft and a number of warships, and even more upon mutual agreement. 23 Turkish officials underlined that it was foreseen at the Washington Summit that the involvement of the non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis management operations would be ensured, building on the existing arrangements within the WEU. Turkey's approach regarding the evolving CESDP had been shaped within this framework. Turkey emphasized that the EU's requests from NATO will be assessed by Turkey within the framework of the above-mentioned principles, its national interests and of European security. Turkey's acceptance of an automatic EU access to NATO assets and capabilities was out of the question. Turkey made it clear that it cannot be expected to be content with the EU"s relevant decisions and alter her own views. 24 Therefore the 2000 Feira Council"s conclusions were unacceptable for Turkey, mainly in terms of the participation issue, since in case of an EU operation undertaken with NATO assets, non-EU European NATO members would participate automatically "if they so wish', whereas in the EU-only operations they would simply "be invited" to be involved if the Council saw it appropriate. In Missiroli"s words, the Helsinki and Feira decisions had indeed curtailed the "assured access" of European NATO allies to EU-only operations as compared to the arrangements in place within the WEU. In particular, their eventual "invitation" to join was de facto subject to a unanimous decision, whereas their eventual participation in a WEU-only operation was assured unless "a majority" of full members decided otherwise: the two procedures are indeed quite different. 25 Turkey"s main concerns stemmed from the fact that the position granted to non-EU NATO members was not satisfactory in the current phase when it was compared with those awarded by the WEU. 
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We therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. Identity will continue to be developed within NATO and the decisions on making the Alliances" assets and capabilities available on a "case by case basis", stating:
On a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose (Article 30). In a specific case when any of the non-EU European Allies raises its concerns that an envisaged autonomous EU operation will be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally or may affect its national security interests, the Council will consult with that Ally and, taking into consideration the outcome of those consultations, decide on the participation of that Ally. 30 "European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P)", supra note 11. 31 Ihsan Kiziltan, supra note 5: 36. 32 "ESDP: "Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies"," supra note 9.
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showing a strong determination to support CSDP activities. The EU"s arguments on not consulting Turkey were rather difficult to understand. These arguments were mainly that the aforementioned activities are civilian operations and in accordance with the consultation arrangements only military operations can be consulted. In fact, the arrangements that established the acquis of the NATO-EU cooperation did not differentiate between civilian or military operations; they apply to all sorts of operations.
It is not only Turkey who is putting these arguments forward, but also NATO"s top official Rasmussen was quoted by the Danish press on July 7, 2010 that he finds it unfair that the Turks are not included in the decisions on the EU"s peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina since they participate there, too. NATO"s Secretary
General stated that "Turkey is the second largest contributor to the EU"s operation in Bosnia, but Turkey is not included in the decision making process. That is unfair.
The EU should clearly signal that Turkey belongs to the western circle". 33 In the same news, EUFOR"s spokesman Major Bruce Foster is also quoted as saying:
"Turkey is an important partner that is fully involved in a number of areas in the operation" 
days Turkey frequently reminded its expectation from its Allies and the EU Member
States of the adherence to decisions taken and arrangements laid down at the highest level for such cooperation. 36 In fact, Turkey has never wished to hinder NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but has continually underscored the need for abiding by agreed decisions and commitments as necessary.
TURKEY'S EXCLUSION FROM EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY COOPERATION PROJECTS
A striking aspect of the matter is related to Turkey"s exclusion from European We are being blocked away from European Defence Agency, security arrangements with EU and this is happening by one member"s opposition, by one member"s veto in a way, although this implementation protocol says that non-EU European countries should be involved more in the security issues, Witney"s remarks bluntly describe the current stalemate. However, high level officials" remarks and complaints do not change anything, so long as these discourses are not put into practice. The Greek Cypriot Administration did not become a full member to the EU automatically; it was a result of the consensus reached by all the EU members. The consequences of accepting the Greek Cypriots as an EU member before the Cyprus problem was resolved had to be considered with due care and caution; unfortunately at the time this was not the case. Now not only Turkey, but the entire EU itself is faced with these negative consequences. In essence, the overall picture explained above in terms of establishing the necessary link between EDA and Turkey clearly shows that there is not any genuine institutional impediment in the way. The current impasse is simply the result of Greek Cypriots" objection and purely political.
WHY CAN TURKEY NOT CONCLUDE A SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH THE EU?
Another example of the approach of the EU in terms of the involvement of non-EU Allies in CSDP is the prevention of the conclusion of a permanent security agreement between Turkey and the EU. Such agreements provide the necessary guarantees for the protection of EU classified information released to third parties relating to any area of the Union's activity. The EU has concluded specific agreements more limited in scope with a number of third countries. These agreements may be concluded for an indefinite period (such as framework participation agreements with third States taking part in EU-led ESDP crisis management operations) or on a temporary or ad hoc basis. 42 Turkey concluded ad hoc agreements or arrangements of limited duration with the EU that will allow the exchange of EU classified information in specific operational contexts to which Turkey has been contributing. However, the permanent security agreement on the exchange of classified information has not been realized. 41 Ibid. NATO is regularly revising its own modalities with a very transparent and open approach. However, the same exercises are not taking place on the EU"s side. In fact, the EU is failing to comply with its own arrangements in terms of involving non-EU Allies. As an outcome of this approach revision of the existing mechanisms are not taking place on the EU"s side.
Another striking difference is in terms of bringing together the political wills of member states of each organization. On NATO"s side, reaching consensus is generally smooth and well functioning. However this is not the case at the EU"s end.
There is a discrepancy between the EU's stated ambition and its actual policies.
Javier Solana's decade as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy demonstrates that personality matters, as do institutions. But neither will make up for a lack of political will on the part of member states. For example the disagreements between the EU's member states over Iraq made it impossible to form a united EU policy. The EU decision-makers stepped back from the big questions and instead focused on the areas where the EU could make a difference. This has led to missions that are often limited in scope and time, in the western Balkans, in Africa, but also in Aceh (Indonesia) and Georgia. The Lisbon Treaty could serve as an opportunity to be exploited in the abovementioned matters. Treaty-based authority, including a right of initiative and a foothold in the European Commission, plus much more staff and financial resources will definitely make a difference. The Lisbon Treaty could be a useful tool in terms of closing the gap between ambition and achievement. 50 There were many times that Solana was The issue of achieving solidarity has been high on the EU"s agenda, whereas at NATO solidarity clause constitutes the backbone of the Alliance"s decisions and actions. The working rationales of the two organizations are different at this junction, as well. Lack of political will of the member states is reflected in the EU"s common policies, as well as in NATO-EU relations. Once the EU starts to take bigger steps in achieving solidarity in political terms, its positive ramifications over the NATO-EU cooperation will be visible as well.
NATO-EU COOPERATION AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION
"Berlin plus" arrangements and the implementation thereof apply only to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the However, the Greek Cypriots rejected it with a 75 percent majority, and efforts to allow a unified Cyprus to join the EU thus failed. 
